FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 246794. December 2, 2021.]
JOSE SOLLANO, petitioner, vs. MA. ROSARIO ZAIDE-SOLLANO, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated December 2, 2021 which reads as follows:
“G.R. No. 246794 — Jose Sollano v. Ma. Rosario Zaide-Sollano.
The Case
This Petition for Review assails the following dispositions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 144945 entitled “Jose Sollano v. Ma. Rosario Zaide-Sollano:”
1. Decision dated December 12, 2018, affirming the validity of the settlement agreement between spouses petitioner and respondent; and
2. Resolution dated April 16, 2019, denying petitioner’s Motion for reconsideration.
Antecedents
Petitioner Jose Sollano and respondent Ma. Rosario Zaide-Sollano are married but have been living separately since 2006. They begot three (3) children, namely: Hannah Monica (Hannah), Ma. Michaella Rosario (Michaella) and Jose Luis Matthias III (Jose), all of legal age and surnamed Sollano. At present, Hannah and Michaella are living with petitioner while Jose lives with respondent. Their property relation is governed by the conjugal partnership of gains. 1
Sometime in August 2011, petitioner and respondent engaged the services of Atty. Rita Linda V. Jimeno (Atty. Jimeno), a mediator accredited by the Court and the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA) to supervise the Execution of a possible Compromise Agreement for the dissolution and Partition of their conjugal assets and the bequeathal of personal properties and Devise of real properties to their three (3) children, without court intervention. The parties also agreed to equally shoulder the expenses for the mediation process. 2
On several occasions, the spouses met and talked with Atty. Jimeno. During the meeting held on October 17, 2011 at EDSA Shangri-La Hotel in Mandaluyong City, they agreed to reduce in writing all matters they agreed upon in their previous conferences. Thereafter, they signed the handwritten agreement denominated as “Dissolution of Property and Support,” witnessed by Atty. Jimeno and the couple’s son. The handwritten Compromise Agreement reads:
“Agreement on Dissolution of Property and Support”
We, Jose D. Sollano, M.D. and Ma. Rosario Zaide-Sollano, both of legal age, Filipinos, legally married to each other hereby agree to the following:
1. That we shall dissolve, divide and Partition our conjugal assets and provide Legitime to our children as follows:
1.A. The Ayala Heights property inclusive of the lots and all the improvements thereon shall belong to Maria Rosario Sollano. Maria Rosario Sollano, however, shall transfer immediately the title to the said property to Jose Luis Matthias Z. Sollano, her son.
1.B. The Clinics at Medical City, Asian Hospital and UST and any share of stock in any hospital which the spouses purchased shall belong to Dr. Jose D. Sollano.
1.C. The properties registered in the spouses’ name or Dr. Sollano’s name shall be transferred to their three children, namely: Hannah Monica, Ma. Michaella Rosario and Jose Luis Matthias; provided that Jose Luis Matthias shall be given one property as his exclusive share considering that his two sisters had earlier been given a property each.
1.D. Dr. Sollano shall give a car to his son Jose Luis Matthias but shall keep the other in his possession and ownership.
2. The spouses hereby agree to pay for their conjugal debt to LBC Bank and to Mr. Jack Garcia and shall sell their Tagaytay property and Sta. Rosa property for this purpose. If the proceeds of these properties shall not be enough, we shall likewise sell the one-half hectare property along the highway in Davao and the ‘Faller’ building and lot on which it stands, also the property in Davao.
3. Any balance in the proceeds, if at all, after paying the LBC loans and the Jack Garcia loan shall be divided equally between us. However, Ma. Rosario agrees that from her share she will pay the amount of P318,000.00 to Mrs. Estelita Sollano.
4. Dr. Sollano agrees to pay for Jose Luis Matthias’ tuition fees until he finishes and completes his college education.
5. We, the parties also agree to sign and execute any and all the implementing documents necessary to carry into effect this agreement.
In truth whereof, we have signed this handwritten document on October 17, 2011 in Mandaluyong City.
6. Addendum:
If the ‘Faller’ building shall not be used to pay off the debts, it shall be sold and the proceeds shall be divided equally between them after deducting all expenses relative to the transfer of the ‘Faller’ property to them. 3
The parties thereafter agreed to submit to Atty. Jimeno the appraisal, inventory, and certificates of title covering the subject properties for purposes of facilitating their disposal and implementation of their agreement. Petitioner, however, subsequently refused to comply with the terms of the said agreement despite several demands from Atty. Jimeno. 4
On February 12, 2013, assisted by Atty. Jimeno and Atty. Aniano Desierto, the parties met to discuss some issues relative to the terms of their agreement. As petitioner continued to renege on his obligation therein, respondent referred the matter to the Barangay Lupon Tagapamayapa (Lupon) where petitioner failed to appear. 5 The Lupon thereafter issued a Certification to File Action. 6
Petitioner’s repeated non-compliance with the Compromise Agreement prompted respondent to send him a demand letter, through Atty. Jimeno, insisting that petitioner do his part in the Execution of the terms of their mediated settlement, but to no avail. 7
Respondent then filed a petition for Dissolution of Property & Support before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)-Branch 107, Quezon City, for the enforcement of the mediated settlement pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 9285 8 and A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC otherwise known as “Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution.” 9
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision 10 dated June 8, 2015, the trial court ordered the enforcement of the Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the Agreement entered into between the parties before the mediator selected by the parties to settle their disputes is a valid and mediated settlement/agreement and that there is no merit in any of the affirmative defenses raised by the respondent. Respondent having breached the Compromise Agreement signed by them, the Court hereby orders the enforcement of the said Agreement.
SO ORDERED. 11
The trial court held that the Compromise Agreement was binding on the parties because there was no showing that the consent of one or the other was vitiated; that the parties’ signatures were forged; or that the terms of the agreement were palpably unconscionable. The Compromise Agreement readily disclosed the terms agreed upon by the parties for dissolution and settlement of their property regime. The handwritten Compromise Agreement was also executed and signed in the presence of two (2) Witnesses, namely: Jose, the couple’s son and mediator Atty. Jimeno. 12 It also does not appear that the contents of the document pertain only to the parties’ initial discussion over the conjugal partnership. Finally, if indeed petitioner’s consent was obtained by mistake, he should have filed the necessary action before the court to declare the Compromise Agreement void. 13
On August 14, 2015, respondent moved for the Execution of the aforesaid decision.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration three (3) days later. Per Resolution 14 dated March 1, 2016, both the motions for Execution and reconsideration were denied. According to the trial court, the Motion for Execution was prematurely filed since petitioner’s Motion for reconsideration had yet to be resolved.
Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals
On appeal, petitioner argued that the Compromise Agreement, being one for the dissolution and Partition of conjugal assets, there must be a full trial and adjudication by a court of law before any of its terms may be implemented. Also, its enforcement cannot be ordered following a mere summary proceeding since the requisite procedure intended for the protection of third parties, the spouses’ children, and even the spouses themselves was not complied with. 15
Atty. Jimeno was not mutually chosen by the parties. Too, contrary to Article 3.10 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 876, 16 Atty. Jimeno acted as respondent’s counsel when her only role should have been to mediate and facilitate the Execution of the Compromise Agreement. 17 She gave legal advice to respondent and even meddled with the spouses’ decision-making when she persuaded petitioner to accede to the terms of the Compromise Agreement as dictated by respondent. Atty. Jimeno even failed to inform him of his right to have an independent counsel prior to the signing of the Compromise Agreement. 18
Without an accompanying document which lays down the details of the what the parties actually agreed upon, the Compromise Agreement is incomplete, hence, unenforceable. Respondent does not deny that they have agreed to meet at a later date to execute all the implementing documents necessary to effect the Compromise Agreement. 19
On the other hand, respondent riposted that Atty. Jimeno was jointly hired by her and petitioner as evidenced by billing receipts addressed to petitioner. Petitioner was not forced to enter into the Compromise Agreement. In fact, he was the one who made reservations at EDSA Shangri-La Hotel where they executed the Compromise Agreement. 20 She complied with the requirements provided under RA 9285 and the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution. The Compromise Agreement is valid since division of conjugal assets is not a prohibited subject for compromise under Article 2035 of the Civil Code. 21 Neither did the Compromise Agreement pertain to future Legitime or waiver of future support. 22
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
By Decision 23 dated December 12, 2018, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that the Compromise Agreement complied with the procedure laid down under Section 23 of RA 876 and Rule 15 24 of A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC. Respondent deposited with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the trial court the mediated settlement agreement together with all the documents necessary for its enforcement, after due notice to petitioner. 25 Petitioner cannot assail the appointment of Atty. Jimeno as mediator of the parties. For both parties jointly engaged the services of Atty. Jimeno and even shared in paying her professional fees. 26
It cannot be said that the Compromise Agreement was void on ground that petitioner’s consent was vitiated through mistake. For one, it was petitioner himself who set the October 17, 2011 meeting at EDSA Shangri-La Hotel and insisted that their youngest son Luis, be present there as well. For another, petitioner’s intellectual level, being a physician who pursued postgraduate education, would negate his claim of vitiated consent. Petitioner, a literate fellow is presumed to have voluntarily entered into the Compromise Agreement in question with full understanding of its consequences. If indeed petitioner was aggrieved by the terms and conditions of the Compromise Agreement or that the terms were not in line with his expectations, he should have objected thereto at the first instance and insisted on the provisions he considered fair and equitable under the circumstances. This petitioner failed to do. Petitioner only had a change of heart and simply refused to abide by the terms of the agreement and to comply with his obligations as provided therein. 27
Finally, contrary to petitioner’s claim, the Compromise Agreement is valid since it did not provide for waiver of future support and future Legitime. The children made no waiver with respect to their right to future inheritance. Neither did the parties agree to deprive their children of their entitlement to the spouses’ present properties, by way of Legitime, or those which they may acquire in the future. 28
Through Resolution 29 dated April 16, 2019, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s Motion for reconsideration.
The Present Petition
Petitioner now seeks affirmative relief via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. He challenges anew the Compromise Agreement for being contrary to law, specifically Articles 126, 134, and 136 of the Family Code.
In her Comment 30 dated December 6, 2019, respondent asserts that the Compromise Agreement was freely entered into by her and petitioner and it is not contrary to law. The matters which cannot be compromised are enumerated in Article 2035. 31 That enumeration is exclusive, hence, whatever is not included there is deemed excluded. That Atty. Jimeno sent petitioner a demand letter does not mean the former acted as respondent’s counsel. She (Atty. Jimeno) simply did what a prudent mediator would have done under the circumstances, especially since petitioner has reneged on his obligation under the Compromise Agreement. 32 Finally, petitioner was aware of the deposit of the Compromise Agreement before the Clerk of Court but made no objections thereto. It is only when he was being made to perform his part of the agreement that he started questioning it. 33
Issue
May the husband and wife validly enter into a Compromise Agreement dissolving their property regime?
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is any process or procedure used to resolve a dispute or controversy, other than by adjudication of a presiding judge of a court or an officer of a government agency in which a neutral third party participates to assist in the resolution of issues. It includes arbitration, mediation, 34 conciliation, early neutral evaluation, mini-trial, or any combination thereof. 35 Otherwise stated, the ADR System excludes from its application any dispute or controversy which would require “the adjudication of a presiding judge of a court or an officer of a government agency.”
Following a successful alternative dispute process, i.e., mediation, the parties may enter into a settlement agreement/Compromise Agreement which shall contain the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties. 36 Like any other contract, it must comply with the requisite provisions in Article 1318 of the New Civil Code: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation which is established. 37 The Compromise Agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, and public policy; and must have been freely and intelligently executed by and between the parties. 38
Here, petitioner and respondent, with the assistance of mediator Atty. Jimeno, entered into a Compromise Agreement dissolving their property regime. The Compromise Agreement has for its object the voluntary dissolution and Partition of the spouses’ property regime; the settlement of marital obligations; the support of the spouses’ son; and the distribution of conjugal property among the spouses and their children, viz.:
“Agreement on Dissolution of Property and Support”
We, Jose D. Sollano, M.D. and Ma. Rosario Zaide-Sollano, both of legal age, Filipinos, legally married to each other hereby agree to the following:
1. That we shall dissolve, divide and Partition our conjugal assets and provide Legitime to our children as follows:
1.A. The Ayala Heights property inclusive of the lots and all the improvements thereon shall belong to Maria Rosario Sollano. Maria Rosario Sollano, however, shall transfer immediately the title to the said property to Jose Luis Matthias Z. Sollano, her son.
1.B. The Clinics at Medical City, Asian Hospital and UST and any share of stock in any hospital which the spouses purchased shall belong to Dr. Jose D. Sollano.
1.C. The properties registered in the spouses’ name or Dr. Sollano’s name shall be transferred to their three children, namely: Hannah Monica, Ma. Michaella Rosario and Jose Luis Matthias; provided that Jose Luis Matthias shall be given one property as his exclusive share considering that his two sisters had earlier been given a property each.
1.D. Dr. Sollano shall give a car to his son Jose Luis Matthias but shall keep the other in his possession and ownership.
2. The spouses hereby agree to pay for their conjugal debt to LBC Bank and to Mr. Jack Garcia and shall sell their Tagaytay property and Sta. Rosa property for this purpose. If the proceeds of these properties shall not be enough, we shall likewise sell the one-half hectare property along the highway in Davao and the ‘Faller’ building and lot on which it stands, also the property in Davao.
3. Any balance in the proceeds, if at all, after paying the LBC loans and the Jack Garcia loan shall be divided equally between us. However, Ma. Rosario agrees that from her share she will pay the amount of P318,000.00 to Mrs. Estelita Sollano.
4. Dr. Sollano agrees to pay for Jose Luis Matthias’ tuition fees until he finishes and completes his college education.
5. We, the parties also agree to sign and execute any and all the implementing documents necessary to carry into effect this agreement.
In truth whereof, we have signed this handwritten document on October 17, 2011 in Mandaluyong City.
6. Addendum:
If the ‘Faller’ building shall not be used to pay off the debts, it shall be sold and the proceeds shall be divided equally between them after deducting all expenses relative to the transfer of the ‘Faller’ property to them. 39
Under Article 134 of the Family Code, 40 the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient cause.
Toda, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 41 is apropos:
Hence, the separation of property is not effected by the mere Execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes effective only upon judicial approval, without which it is void. Furthermore, Article 192 of said Code explicitly provides that the conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the issuance of a decree of separation of property. 42
Further, in voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains, the spouses are required to file a verified petition before the court and notify both their conjugal and personal creditors of the filing thereof. Article 136 of the same Code provides:
Article 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court for the voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, and for the separation of their common properties.
All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership of gains, as well as the personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in the petition and notified of the filing thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest.
To recall, the Compromise Agreement in question does not only stipulate on the dissolution and Partition of herein spouses’ conjugal assets; it also provided for the payment of conjugal debts, i.e., loans with LBC Bank and to Mr. Jack Garcia. In consonance with Article 136 of the Family Code, Article 191 of the Civil Code underscores the need for the court’s intervention in voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership for purposes of safeguarding the interest of creditors and other third persons who may be affected by the dissolution of the spouses’ property regime, thus:
Article 191.
xxx xxx xxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval or the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons. [Emphasis supplied]
Here, there is no showing, as none was shown, that petitioner and respondent notified their conjugal creditors LBC Bank and Mr. Jack Garcia of the voluntary dissolution of their property regime prior to its Execution. There was no way, therefore, that these creditors could have been able to protect their pecuniary interest against their debtor spouses. To be sure, without judicial proceedings and notice to conjugal creditors, the spouses could easily divide and dispose of their assets for their own personal benefit, and their creditors would be left without any conjugal property to satisfy their monetary claims against them.
Another. While the RTC-Branch 107, Quezon City, through its Decision dated June 8, 2015, ordered the enforcement of the Compromise Agreement, the same does not equate to the judicial order contemplated under Article 134 which would render the Compromise Agreement in question valid, precisely because it failed to comply with the requirements provided under Article 136.
Respondent further insists that the Compromise Agreement is valid since division of conjugal assets is not among the matters which may not be subject of a compromise under Article 2035 of the Civil Code. 43 Neither did the Compromise Agreement pertain to future Legitime or waiver of future support.
The fact that the Compromise Agreement did not stipulate on waiver of future support and future Legitime is beside the point. The fact remains that the spouses dissolved their property regime and partitioned their conjugal assets without the requisite court intervention and without notifying their creditors in violation of Sections 134 and 136 of the Family Code.
In fine, the voluntary dissolution of property regime by petitioner and respondent here, perfected through the assailed Compromise Agreement, is void. For the parties failed to comply with the procedure set forth by the Family Code on voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership during the marriage.
In view of the invalid Compromise Agreement, the Court will no longer belabor to discuss the other issues raised by petitioner, i.e., whether his consent was vitiated through mistake.
All told, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the validity of the Compromise Agreement dated October 17, 2011.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 12, 2018 and Resolution dated April 16, 2019 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Compromise Agreement dated October 17, 2011 between petitioner JOSE SOLLANO and respondent MA. ROSARIO ZAIDE-SOLLANO is void for violating Articles 134 and 136 of the Family Code.
The respondent’s: (1) manifestation with Motion to admit comment/opposition is NOTED and GRANTED; and (2) comment on the petition for review on Certiorari is NOTED.
The respondent is hereby required to SUBMIT, within five (5) days from notice hereof, a soft copy in compact disc, USB or e-mail containing the PDF file of the signed manifestation with Motion to admit comment/opposition, pursuant to A.M. Nos. 10-3-7-SC and 11-9-4-SC.
SO ORDERED.”
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENA
Division Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULO
Deputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
2. Rollo, p. 47.
3. Id. at 48-49.
4. Id. at 49.
5. Id. at 50.
6. Id. at 137.
7. Id.
8. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004.
9. Rollo, p. 51.
10. Penned by Presiding Judge Jose L. Bautista, Jr.; id. at 87-94.
11. Id. at 93.
12. Id. at 89-90.
13. Id. at 92.
14. Penned by Presiding Judge Jose L. Bautista, Jr.; id. at 95-101.
15. Id. at 51.
16. Section 23. Confirmation of award. — At any time within one month after the award is made, any party to the controversy which was arbitrated may apply to the court having Jurisdiction, as provided in section twenty-eight, for an order confirming the award; and thereupon the court must grant such order unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected, as prescribed herein. Notice of such Motion must be served upon the Adverse Party or his attorney as prescribed by law for the service of such notice upon an attorney in action in the same court.
17. Article 3.10. Separation of Mediation from Counseling and Legal Advice.
(a) Except in evaluative mediation or when the parties so request, a mediator shall:
(i) refrain from giving legal or technical advice and otherwise engaging in counseling or advocacy; and
(ii) abstain from expressing his/her personal opinion on the rights and duties of the parties and the merits of any proposal made.
(b) Where appropriate and where either or both parties are not represented by counsel, a mediator shall:
(i) recommend that the parties seek outside professional advice to help them make informed decision and to understand the implications of any proposal; and
(ii) suggest that the parties seek independent legal and/or technical advice before a settlement agreement is signed.
Without the consent of all parties, and for a reasonable time under the particular circumstance, a mediator who also practices another profession shall not establish a professional relationship in that other profession with one of the parties, or any person or entity, in a substantially and factually related matter.
18. Rollo, p. 78.
19. Id. at 80.
20. Id. at 136.
21. Id. at 142.
22. Id. at 143.
23. Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and concurred in by Associate Justices Edwin D. Sorongon and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi; rollo, pp. 46-58.
24. RULE 15: DEPOSIT AND ENFORCEMENT OF MEDIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
Rule 15.1. Who makes a deposit. — Any party to a mediation that is not court-annexed may deposit with the court the written settlement agreement, which resulted from that mediation.
Rule 15.2. When deposit is made. — At any time after an agreement is reached, the written settlement agreement may be deposited.
Rule 15.3. Venue. — The written settlement agreement may be jointly deposited by the parties or deposited by one party with prior notice to the other party/ies with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court.
(a) where the principal place of business in the Philippines of any of the parties is located; (b) if any of the parties is an individual, where any of those individuals resides; or (c) in the National Capital Judicial Region.
Rule 15.4. Registry Book. — The Clerk of Court of each Regional Trial Court shall keep a Registry Book that shall chronologically list or enroll all the mediated settlement agreements/settlement awards that are deposited with the court as well as the names and address of the parties thereto and the date of enrollment and shall issue a Certificate of Deposit to the party that made the deposit.
Rule 15.5. Enforcement of mediated settlement agreement. — Any of the parties to a mediated settlement agreement, which was deposited with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, may, upon breach thereof, file a verified petition with the same court to enforce said agreement.
Rule 15.6. Contents of petition. — The verified petition shall:
a. Name and designate, as petitioner or respondent, all parties to the mediated settlement agreement and those who may be affected by it; b. State the following:
(i). The addresses of the petitioner and respondents; and
(ii). The ultimate facts that would show that the Adverse Party has defaulted to perform its obligation under said agreement; and
c. Have attached to it the following:
(i). An authentic copy of the mediated settlement agreement; and
(ii). Certificate of Deposit showing that the mediated settlement agreement was deposited with the Clerk of Court.
Rule 15.7. Opposition. — The Adverse Party may file an opposition, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice or service of the petition, by submitting written proof of compliance with the mediated settlement agreement or such other affirmative or negative defenses it may have.
Rule 15.8. Court action. — After a summary hearing, if the court finds that the agreement is a valid mediated settlement agreement, that there is no merit in any of the affirmative or negative defenses raised, and the respondent has breached that agreement, in whole or in part, the court shall order the enforcement thereof; otherwise, it shall dismiss the petition.
25. Rollo, pp. 51-53.
26. Id. at 53.
27. Id. at 53-54.
28. Id. at 57.
29. Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and concurred in by Associate Justices Edwin D. Sorongon and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi; id. at 60-61.
30. Id. at 214-221.
31. Article 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The Jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future Legitime.
32. Id. at 217.
33. Id. at 219.
34. Section 3 (q) of RA 9285 — “Mediation” means a voluntary process in which a mediator, selected by the disputing parties, facilitates communication and negotiation, and assist the parties in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding a dispute.
35. Section 3 (a), RA 9285.
36. Section 17 of RA 9285.
37. Rivero, et al. v. Court of Appeals, 498 Phil. 1, 21 (2005).
38. Magbanua, et al. v. Uy, 497 Phil. 511, 518 (2005).
39. Rollo, pp. 48-49.
40. Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient cause.
41. 262 Phil. 777, 786 (1990).
42. Id.
43. Rollo, p. 142.